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Another Attempt to Quantify 
the Benefits of Reducing Inflation 
R. Anton Braun 
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Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Over the last several years, the U.S. inflation rate has 
dropped below 4 percent per year—to levels common in 
the mid-1960s. This is widely regarded as a good thing. 
But would further reductions in the inflation rate make a 
good thing even better? Economists can offer answers to 
this policy question by analyzing economic models that 
quantify the welfare benefits of a lower inflation rate.
1 
Still, a model's results are critically affected by the as-
sumptions made in constructing it. One type of assump-
tion, which I will focus on here, is how the government 
replaces the revenue lost when the inflation rate is re-
duced. Economists view inflation as a tax on activities that 
use money.
2 When this source of revenue is reduced, a 
government that wants to maintain its current level of 
spending must replace the lost revenue from inflation by 
raising other taxes or creating new ones. The size of the 
welfare benefits from reducing the current inflation rate 
will, therefore, depend critically on the model's assump-
tions about how the government replaces this revenue. 
One of the best-known prescriptions for monetary poli-
cy, for instance, seems to suggest that the welfare benefits 
from reducing inflation would be quite large. The Fried-
man rule, proposed by Milton Friedman in 1969, calls for 
a monetary policy that maintains a zero nominal interest 
rate. In a setting with no uncertainty, that policy involves 
a negative inflation rate, or deflation. Wouter Den Haan 
(1990) and Robert Lucas (1993) have quantified the bene-
fits of reducing a moderate inflation rate of about 4 or 5 
percent to the rate prescribed by the Friedman rule. They 
find that the benefits of such a reduction could be sub-
stantial, ranging from $60 billion to over $200 billion. To 
get some perspective on the size of those numbers, note 
that the U.S. economy produces about $6 trillion worth of 
goods and services each year. Since 1 percent of this gross 
domestic product (GDP) is around $60 billion, Den Haan 
and Lucas' results suggest that the welfare benefits from 
adopting the Friedman rule would range from 1 percent to 
3 percent of GDP. 
To get these results, however, Den Haan and Lucas 
follow Friedman and assume that the government can re-
place the revenue lost by adopting the Friedman rule with 
a lump-sum tax, that is, a tax independent of an individu-
al's income, wealth, or consumption patterns. Such an as-
sumption may well be unrealistic. 
Great Britain's recent experience with the community 
charge—popularly referred to as the poll tax—illustrates 
1Welfare measures a household's satisfaction level. A household's satisfaction in-
creases with the amount of goods and services it consumes and the time it spends in 
leisure pursuits. To compare the effects of two different tax policies, economists at-
tempt to ascertain how welfare changes under them. A dollar figure can be assigned 
to these welfare comparisons by determining how much income would be needed to 
provide the household with the same level of welfare under the two policies. For anoth-
er description of this common way to evaluate policy options, see the work of Rao 
Aiyagari (1990, pp. 2-3). 
2For a good description of why this is so—and good background reading for my 
article—see Aiyagari 1990. 
17 the potential problems associated with lump-sum taxation. 
In 1989, Britain began assessing a poll tax in Scotland. In 
1990, the tax was extended to England and Wales. Public 
reaction to this tax was overwhelmingly negative; the tax 
provoked street protests throughout Britain and riots in 
London. At least partly as a result, in November 1990, the 
Conservative party revolted and put the prime minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, out of office. The new prime minister, 
John Major, revoked major provisions of the poll tax in 
his first budget. 
Although this is just one experience, a lump-sum tax 
seems unlikely to be any better received in the United 
States. But ruling out lump-sum taxes can have a funda-
mental impact on the desirability of reducing the inflation 
rate. Most other types of taxes distort households' incen-
tives to save and to supply labor. Consequently, when 
evaluating the benefits from reducing inflation, researchers 
must also consider the costs that increasing other taxes, 
such as the income tax, have on households' incentives. 
Edmund Phelps (1973) argues that when a benevolent 
government has only distortionary taxes at its disposal, it 
will generally choose to raise some revenue from infla-
tion. However, Phelps' analysis is silent on the question 
of how much inflation is desirable. 
Here I investigate whether Phelps' argument is quan-
titatively important. To do so, I first describe a simple 
model economy and calibrate it to match some of the 
main features of the modern U.S. economy. I then use this 
model to quantify the benefits from reducing inflation un-
der the assumption that the revenue lost from that reduc-
tion is replaced with a higher tax on labor income. Two 
specific findings emerge. I find that the optimal rate of in-
flation is higher than the rate prescribed by the Friedman 
rule, but still negative. I also find that the welfare gains 
from reducing inflation are smaller than $17 billion, while 
small mistakes in setting monetary policy could produce 
welfare losses larger than $37 billion. Thus, my model 
suggests that small benefits—in the range of from one-
third to one-half of 1 percent of GDP—are all that could 




To quantify the effects described by Phelps (1973), I must 
model how inflation and the income tax affect households' 
incentives to save and to supply labor. I do that by making 
assumptions about households' preferences for goods and 
leisure, describing how goods are produced, and explain-
ing how wages and interest rates are determined. 
Firms, Households, and the Government 
To keep things simple, I will consider an economy with 
no capital, where competitive firms choose labor input to 
maximize profits. The production technology is assumed 
to be linear in labor input: 
(1) y = eh. 
I will find it convenient to express variables in per capita 
terms. So, in this expression, e is the fraction of the pop-
ulation that works, h is the average number of hours 
worked per worker in a period, and y is per capita output. 
All households have identical preferences, which are de-
fined over consumption and leisure: 
(2) U = u{d) - v(J-V). 
Here c
l denotes consumption by the ith household, /' is 
the household's leisure, and T is the total endowment of 
time. Household utility U is assumed to be strictly increas-
ing in consumption and leisure, with diminishing marginal 
returns. Throughout this article, household utility is the 
criterion used to make welfare comparisons of alternative 
government policies. 
The way leisure enters the utility function will greatly 
influence what the model says about the welfare gains 
from reducing inflation. For instance, if labor supply is to-
tally inelastic to changes in the after-tax wage rate, then 
following the Friedman rule and raising all government 
revenue from a tax on labor income is an optimal govern-
ment policy. More generally, if labor supply is highly in-
elastic, then a welfare-maximizing tax policy will call for 
a high tax on labor income and a low inflation rate. 
Empirical evidence on labor supply elasticities is mixed. 
Evidence from international empirical studies using micro-
economic data suggests that hours worked by men in their 
prime working years show little response to changes in 
after-tax wage rates. [For a survey of this literature, see 
the work of John Pencavel (1986).] In addition, the pre-
ponderance of evidence indicates an inelastic labor supply 
for married women. [See the work of Thomas Mroz 
(1987).] But these studies abstract from the workers' deci-
sion on whether or not to participate in the labor market, 
3 Recently, Robert Lucas (1994) has extended his 1993 analysis to consider cases 
where the revenue lost from reduced inflation is replaced with a tax on labor income. 
He argues that the gains from adopting the Friedman rule remain large in that scenario. 
The difference between Lucas' conclusions and mine is likely due to differences in the 
way we model the labor supply decision. 
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and evidence from aggregate data suggests that this deci-
sion should not be ignored. While the average number of 
hours worked weekly per worker is only about one-fourth 
as variable as gross domestic product (GDP), the aggre-
gate number of hours worked varies by about the same 
amount as GDP These facts have led Gary Hansen (1985) 
and Richard Rogerson (1988) to propose preference spec-
ifications in which all of the variation in aggregate labor 
input is due to variations in employment, or the number of 
workers employed. More recently, Finn Kydland and 
Edward Prescott (1991), Andreas Hornstein and Edward 
Prescott (1993), Jang-Ok Cho and Thomas Cooley (1994), 
and Ellen McGrattan and I (1994) have considered speci-
fications that allow for variation both in the number of 
days worked in a given period and in the length of the 
workday. 
I consider one such extension here. Suppose, as do Cho 
and Cooley (1994), that the fraction of days worked by 
members of household i in a period is represented by e\ 
If the utility function (2) measures total daily utility, then 
average daily utility over the period is 
(3) w(c') - v{T-iy. 
Assume also that working more days in a given period 
produces direct utility costs for a household.
4 This could 
be true for a variety of reasons. Increasing the number of 
days worked in a period means less time available for fam-
ily activities and household chores as well as higher costs 
from dividing up household responsibilities, such as pick-
ing up the kids from day care. These considerations sug-
gest that utility is decreasing in e
1.
5
 Under this additional 
assumption, average daily utility during the period can be 
represented as 
(4) w(c') - v(t-i)e
l - q(e
ly. 
Cho and Cooley (1994) have shown that an equilibrium 
framework with preferences of this form can explain the 
labor market facts that average weekly hours are smooth 
although employment variations are large. 
The way money is modeled can also have an important 
effect on the welfare gains from reducing inflation. I will 
follow the transaction demand literature and assume that 
conducting transactions has a time cost. [See the work of 
Bennett McCallum (1983).] This cost, which is increasing 
in the amount consumed and decreasing in real balances, 
is given by 
(5) 4>(c>j) 
where m\ is period t real balances. The most frequently 
cited rationale for (5) is the inventory model of cash man-
agement. In that model, households carry an inventory of 
cash to make purchases. Each time this inventory is de-
pleted, households incur a cost to replenish it. These costs 
might include forgone leisure time, shoe-leather costs, or 
the fee for using an automatic teller machine.
6 
I will assume that households discount future utility and 
have infinite planning horizons. Robert Barro (1974), for 
example, has shown that an infinite planning horizon can 
be derived from an arrangement in which households have 
finite planning horizons and value the utility of their chil-
dren. A typical household's present value utility is given 
by 
(6) £j 
where (3 is the preference discount rate and 
(7) r-/; = /$ + #. 
The household's budget constraint is 
(8) Ptc
it + M
it + B\ 
< (1-tt)Wth\e
lt + M\_x + (1 +Rt_x)B\_x + S\. 
Here Pt is the price of consumption in period t,M\ = Ptm\ 
is the holdings of money at the end of period t, and B\ is 
new acquisitions of bonds in period t. These bonds cost 
$1 today and pay their holder $1(1+/?,) next period. Also, 
Tt is a proportional tax on labor income, Wt is the nominal 
wage rate, and S\ is a lump-sum transfer to the household. 
Note that negative values of S\ correspond to a lump-sum 
tax. 
Given these assumptions, the household's problem is 
to maximize (6) subject to (8). The first-order necessary 
4I will assume that the fraction of days worked in a period is perfectly divisible. 
For an analysis that assumes this fraction is indivisible, see Hornstein and Prescott 
1993. 
5For a more detailed justification for utility to be decreasing in e\ see the work of 
Cho and Cooley (1994); they explicitly model a home production sector. 
6I will assume further that <|> satisfies (j)(0,/?z) = 0, <J)U >0, > 0, <J>12 < 0, and 
<|)n(J)22 - <f>i2 - The first condition says that transaction costs are zero if no goods are 
purchased. The remaining assumptions ensure that (|> is convex. 
19 conditions for this problem include the following equa-
tions: 
(9) [u\c\) - vWl^flJ/v'W) = Pt/[(l-Tt)Wt] 
(10) eivQi^) + q(e\) + WQi^tWt =
 1 
(11) 1 + (1-t t)(Wt/Pt)eW2t = 1/(1 +/?,). 
Equations (9) and (10) both equate the marginal rate of 
substitution between two goods to their effective relative 
price. Thus, in equation (9), the rate at which households 
want to exchange consumption for leisure is related to the 
relative price of the two goods. Similarly, in equation (10), 
the rate at which households want to exchange a longer 
workday for fewer days of work is related to the effective 
relative price of the two goods. 
Equation (11) summarizes a portfolio balance restric-
tion. A utility-maximizing household will choose its hold-
ings of money and bonds so that it is indifferent on the 
margin between saving with bonds or with money. House-
holds are indifferent between saving with bonds or money 
when the effective return from holding one additional dol-
lar of money for a period equals the return from buying 
one additional dollar's worth of one-period bonds. That 
restriction is expressed in equation (ll).
7 
To complete my specification of the economy, I need to 
describe the government's sources and uses of funds. The 
government raises revenue by taxing labor income and by 
simply printing money (collecting what is known as sei-
gniorage, the difference between how much is printed and 
how much printing costs). The government's revenue is 
used to purchase goods from the private sector and to 
move resources among households (or make transfer pay-
ments). These assumptions imply the following period t 
budget constraint for the government: 
(12) Ptgt-%y/thtet
 + S=Mt-Mt_x. 
Here, gt represents government purchases of goods and 
quantity variables without superscripts are aggregate per 
capita values. 
Finally, the economy's aggregate resource constraint is 
given by 
(13) gt + ct< ethv 
The Steady State and Alternative Policies 
Suppose that markets are competitive and that the govern-
ment chooses to hold government purchases and transfer 
payments constant and to conduct its monetary policy so 
as to maintain a constant growth rate of money.
8 Under 
these additional assumptions, the economy will have a 
steady state in which the market-clearing allocations of 
consumption, real balances, hours, and employment are 
constant. These allocations can be supported by a constant 
nominal interest rate and by a price level and a wage rate 
that grow at a constant rate. 
The allocations and nominal interest rate that character-
ize this steady state are found by solving the following set 
of equations for c, m, h, e, and R given values of g, n, 
and st: 
(14)  vV-v'e<t>,) = (1—x) 
(15)  e(ve+q+q'e)/(v'he) = 1 
(16)  (1-T)«|>2 = -R/(l+R) 
(17)  g + c = eh 
(18)  1/(3 = (1+/?)/(1+jr) 
where nt = Pt+{/Pt - 1 denotes the inflation rate and st = 
s,/p; 
These equations can be used to examine some of the 
implications of alternative government policies. For in-
stance, if R is set to zero as the Friedman rule requires, 
then equation (18) implies that 1 + K = (3. Since P < 1, 
this expression implies that the Friedman rule will involve 
deflation: n < 0. The magnitude of deflation will depend 
on (3, the preference discount rate. This line of thought thus 
explains the well-known characterization of the Friedman 
rule as a monetary policy that produces deflation at the rate 
of time preference. 
Notice next that the Friedman rule also imposes restric-
tions on (16). If R = 0, then so must (j)2, if households are 
7TO see this, notice, from equation (8), that the opportunity cost of holding one ad-
ditional dollar for a period is Rt, which is the interest rate a bondholder gets from hold-
ing a $1 bond for one period. Holding a dollar for a period, however, reduces the time 
spent shopping by the amount -ty2t/Pt. The dollar value of this leisure time today is 
-(1-Tt)Wtet§ltIPt.
 The value of this leisure time next period is simply its value today 
multiplied by (1 +/?,), or -(l+/?,)(l-T,)Wy,<j>2,//
>,. When this expression is equated to 
Rt, the opportunity cost of holding money, the result is equation (11). 
8Notice that, with equation (12), these government policies also pin down x. 
9This characterization of the steady-state allocations and prices tacitly assumes that 
the steady-state growth rate of money equals the inflation rate. This restriction can be 
derived directly. Suppose that the money supply rule is M, = (l+5)A/,_,. Then note that 
in a steady state, m = m implies that (l+S)/(l+7t) = 1. Also, notice that I have imposed 
the equilibrium restrictions that W/P = 1 and = 0. 
20 R. Anton Braun 
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to be willing to hold both money and bonds. Since <j>2 is 
increasing in real balances, the Friedman rule calls for a 
monetary policy that satiates households with real bal-
ances. 
These steady-state restrictions can also be used to in-
vestigate, more generally, the effects of reducing seignior-
age on the government's budget constraint. In a steady 
state, (12) simplifies to 
(19) xeh - s = g + n/(l+ri)m. 
Equation (19) demonstrates that if the government de-
creases seigniorage, then it must increase other taxes, de-




work of Friedman (1969) abstracts from taxes on labor in-
come and assumes that budget balance is maintained by 
imposing a lump-sum tax, which in my framework corre-
sponds to setting 5 to be negative. Under these assump-
tions, the Friedman rule maximizes welfare. Adopting the 
Friedman rule guarantees households the same real rate of 
return from holding money that they get from holding 
bonds, so that households need not waste resources trying 
to economize on their cash holdings. 
Phelps (1973), however, has observed that using lump-
sum taxes to offset the revenue lost from reduced seignior-
age is not an innocuous assumption. He argues that if a 
distortionary tax such as T is increased instead, deflating 
may no longer be a desirable policy. Equation (9) shows 
that increasing x distorts the relative price of consumption 
and leisure, making consumption more expensive than lei-
sure. This has a negative effect on the incentive to supply 
labor. If the government is required to offset any revenue 
losses from reduced seigniorage with increases in other 
distortionary taxes, then the welfare gains from reducing 
inflation must be weighed against the welfare losses that 
occur when other distortionary taxes are increased. Given 
these trade-offs, results from public finance suggest that 
welfare losses increase rapidly as tax rates are increased. 
Thus, a one percentage point increase in the labor income 
tax from a base rate of, say, 40 percent induces a much 
larger welfare loss than a one percentage point increase 
from a base rate of 10 percent. One implication of this re-
sult is that a tax policy that maximizes welfare will often 
call for some taxation of all goods. 
The Model's Parameters 
A question left open by Phelps' (1973) analysis is the 
magnitude of the welfare-maximizing inflation rate. In or-
der to examine this question, I will choose the model's pa-
rameters to match various features of the U.S. data and 
then examine how steady-state welfare changes as I alter 
the inflation rate while holding fixed government purchas-
es and transfers. 
The model's parameters can be divided into three types: 
technology, preference, and government policy. The pa-
rameters for government policy I calibrate to match U.S. 
policy in 1991. To measure the main preference param-
eters, I rely on the analysis of Cho and Cooley (1994). To 
measure the parameters of an aggregate transaction cost 
technology, I use my own strategy—so let's start with 
them. 
Transaction Technology 
I will assume that the transaction technology is of the fol-
lowing general form: 
(20) Mct/nt) = kct[ml/cJ1}1-* 
where 0 is assumed to be greater than one and jj and k are 
nonnegative. [This form of the transaction technology is 
similar to that used by David Marshall (1992).] Note that 
if (20) is substituted into (11), the resulting expression can 
be manipulated to produce 
(21) log(m,) = v0 - v1log[/?/(l+/?f)] + v2log(c,) 
+ v3log(l-x,)<?, 
where 
(22) 0 = 1/v, = l/v3 
(23) p = (0v2-l)/(0-l). 
In order to derive a relationship that can be estimated, I 
will assume that log(ra,), log[/?,/(l+/?,)], and log(q) have 
unit roots and that a linear combination of these three 
variables is stationary or that these variables cointegrate. 
Under this assumption, I can apply results from the econo-
metric literature on cointegration to consistently estimate 
the coefficients v{ and v2 from the following empirical 
specification: 
(24) log(m,) = v0 - Vllog[*,/(!+/?,)] + v2log(c,) + 8, 
10I am tacitly assuming here that a decrease in n decreases government revenue. 
At very high inflation rates, of course, a reduction in inflation might actually increase 
government revenue. 
21 where £, is a stationary random variable.
1
1
 In practice, I 
estimate (24) using the canonical cointegration regression 
estimator proposed by Joon Park (1990). 
• A Note on the Data 
Before discussing estimates of the parameters in (24), let 
me discuss the data I use. 
U.S. consumption data only extend back to 1929, but 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1982) have con-
structed a much longer time series for the net national 
product (NNP). Using longer data sets is desirable when 
estimating cointegration relations because these estimators 
identify the parameters from trends in the data. So I sub-
stitute NNP for consumption in equation (24) and use data 
from Friedman and Schwartz 1982 to extend the sample 
period back to 1900. As long as the trend in NNP is the 
same as the trend in consumption, this substitution is in-
nocuous. 
As my measure of money, I use the monetary base. 
This monetary aggregate is the appropriate one for calcu-
lating seigniorage, but it overstates the amount of cash 
used by U.S. households to conduct transactions.
121 con-
struct real balances by dividing the monetary base by the 
NNP deflator and measure the nominal interest rate using 
data on commercial paper rates. 
• The Estimates 
Using annual data on commercial paper rates, real bal-
ances, and NNP expressed in constant 1982 dollars and a 
sample period extending from 1900 to 1986, I estimate 
the coefficients in equation (24) to be 
(25) \og(mt) = 2.55 - 0.551og[/?,/(l +/?,)] + 0.981og(jr). 
(0.400) (0.036) (0.053) 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. These es-
timates are quite similar to previous estimates by Lucas 
(1993), who uses Ml as the monetary aggregate and an 
interest rate for long-term securities. Lucas estimates the 
interest elasticity to be -0.5 and imposes a unit income 
elasticity. 
Preferences 
Now let's turn to the preference parameters. 
I assume that households discount future utility at the 
rate of 2 percent per year. This implies a value of 0.98 for 
p, the preference discount rate. Preferences are assumed 
to be of this general form: 
(26) u(ct) - v{hfKj),)e, - g(et)et 




I use Cho and Cooley's (1994) parameterization of 
(26). They calibrate the a's so that one-third of the daily 
time endowment is spent in market activities and the em-
ployment rate is 65 percent, and they set = 1 and y2 = 
0.62. These choices allow them to replicate the fraction of 
variation in labor input due to variations in hours per 
worker and employment in U.S. data as well as some of 
the other main features of the U.S. business cycle. 
Government Policy 
The government policy parameters are calibrated to match 
U.S. data for 1991.
1
3 
In that year, the GDP deflator grew at an annual rate of 
4.2 percent, while the consumer price index (CPI) for ur-
ban consumers grew at a rate of 3.9 percent. So I have 
chosen an inflation rate of 4 percent. In conjunction with 
my assumption that (3 = 0.98, this rate implies a nominal 
interest rate of 6.12 percent. 
To link data from the national income and product ac-
counts to my model, I use a narrower measure of output 
than GDP. My measure consists of total consumption ex-
penditures, total government purchases, and one-third of 
the value added from the depository institutions sector. Ac-
cording to this measure of output, in 1991 government pur-
chases were 22 percent of output, and transfers plus inter-
est payments on the debt were 17 percent. These ratios are 
used to pin down g/y and s/y in the model. The value 
added by depository institutions was about 3 percent of my 
output measure in 1991. I assume that one-third of this 
value added is directly related to activities that help house-
holds economize on their cash balances. Therefore, I cali-
brate the scale of the transaction function so that transac-
tion costs are 1 percent of output. 
1
1
 In this expression, e, includes employment and taxes. Thus, the classical assump-
tion of independence of the disturbance and other right-side variables is violated. The 
cointegration literature has established conditions under which the sample covariances 
of the right-side variables and e, converge in probability to zero, and estimators have 
been proposed that allow the use of standard distributional assumptions to perform sta-
tistical inference. Note also that Lawrence Christiano and I (1994) find that the biases 
from estimating (25) in samples of length 85 are small even when the interest rate is 
assumed to be stationary in levels. 
12If the fraction of currency that has been used for, say, black market activities has 
been stable over time, then my estimates should still be reliable. 
,3This is the most recent year for which I can get a complete set of data. The bind-
ing constraint is the value added by depository institutions. 
22 R. Anton Braun 
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Given this parameterization, I use equations (14)—(18) 
to numerically calculate what I will refer to as the baseline 
steady state of the model. Doing so yields implications for 
two other variables: the amount of revenue raised by sei-
gniorage and the rate at which labor income is taxed. The 
baseline steady state predicts that seigniorage revenue is 
0.22 percent of output. This value is somewhat less than 
that in the data. Seigniorage revenue in 1991 was about 
0.47 percent of my measure of output. The model also pre-
dicts a labor tax rate of 39 percent. 
The Results 
Now that my model is calibrated, I can use it to quantify 
the welfare benefits from reducing inflation. 
The accompanying chart shows how the model says 
welfare changes with the inflation rate. Welfare is ex-
pressed as a percentage increase or decrease relative to 
consumption under the baseline parameterization described 
in the preceding section. The values of the chart are calcu-
lated by solving the steady state of the economy described 
earlier at alternative values of the inflation rate while hold-
ing fixed government purchases and transfers. The gov-
ernment's budget constraint is balanced by adjusting the 
labor tax rate. Given a steady state indexed by some njt 
and the baseline steady state indexed by Kh = 0.04, wel-
fare is calculated by finding the value of x that satisfies 
this equation: 
(27) u(c(nb)(l+x)) - v(h(nb) + «%))*(%) 
- g(e(nh))e(Kh) - u(c(Kj)) 
+ v(h(Kj) + <b(nj))e(Kj) + g(e(Kj))e(Kj) = 0. 
In words, x indexes the increment to baseline consumption 
that would make households indifferent to the steady state 
with an inflation rate of nThus, at the baseline inflation 
rate of 4 percent, welfare is zero. 
The chart has several notable features. 
One is that the highest welfare gain occurs when the 
inflation rate is -1.3 percent. This inflation rate is only 
slightly higher than the inflation rate of -2 percent pre-
scribed by the Friedman rule. These results show that 
Phelps' (1973) argument that the optimal inflation rate 
should lie above the rate prescribed by the Friedman rule 
when lump-sum taxes are ruled out is not quantitatively 
important: deflation is still optimal. 
Another notable feature of the chart is that in general 
the welfare gains from reducing inflation are small. Reduc-
ing inflation from its baseline value of 4 percent to the op-
The Model's View of How Welfare Varies With Inflation 
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 For comparison, suppose instead that I adopt the 
approach of Den Haan (1990) and Lucas (1993) and offset 
the revenue lost when reducing the inflation rate by in-
creasing lump-sum taxes. Under this assumption, my mod-
el says, the maximum welfare increase occurs when the 
Friedman rule is adopted. That is, for my parameterization, 
welfare is maximized when the inflation rate is -2 percent. 
Redoing the calculations reported in the chart under these 
alternative assumptions yields a welfare gain of 0.95 per-
cent of baseline consumption, or $37 billion, when the in-
flation rate is -2 percent.
1
5
 Thus, adopting the more plau-
sible assumption that revenue losses are offset by increases 
in taxes on labor income has a significant effect on the po-
tential gains from deflation; they are more than cut in half. 
14This welfare gain is converted into a dollar figure by multiplying 0.0043 by ag-
gregate consumption in 1991, which was $3,906 billion. 
15This number is smaller than the one reported by Lucas (1993). The difference 
can be explained by differences in how we measure output. In Lucas' framework, out-
put is divided between consumption and transaction costs. Thus, a welfare gain of 1 
percent of consumption is also about 1 percent of output. Recall that GDP was about 
$6 trillion in 1992, so 1 percent of GDP is $60 billion. I assume that the welfare gain 
of 1 percent of consumption is only 0.68 percent of GDP. So to compare Lucas' num-
ber with mine, the $60 billion must be multiplied by 0.68, which yields $40.8 billion. 
23 Finally, note that the chart has an asymmetry. As the 
inflation rate falls from its baseline level, welfare first in-
creases gradually, then decreases sharply. However, as the 
inflation rate rises from its baseline level, welfare de-
creases only gradually. While an inflation rate of-1.3 per-
cent increases welfare 0.43 percent, an inflation rate of 
-1.91 percent decreases it by more than 1 percent. A wel-
fare loss of 1 percent is quite large. For instance, it is three 
times larger than the loss associated with an inflation rate 
of 10 percent. 
This asymmetry is important for anyone considering 
policies that would reduce the inflation rate further. Com-
mon measures of inflation have large margins of error. 
David Lebow, John Roberts, and David Stockton (1992, 
1994) estimate, for example, that growth in the CPI, a 
widely used measure of inflation, may overstate the true 
inflation rate by between one-half of a percentage point 
and 1.5 percentage points.
1
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 Suppose that monetary policy 
were set to target the inflation rate as measured by CPI 
growth at the optimal rate. With the amount of inherent 
uncertainty in this measure, a target of, say, -1.3 percent 
implies a true inflation rate in the region where welfare 
losses occur. 
These measurement problems for the CPI have other 
implications for my analysis. If CPI growth overstates the 
true inflation rate by about one percentage point, then an 
evaluation of the gains from reducing inflation should start 
from a baseline inflation rate of around 3 percent rather 
than 4 percent. If I redo my calculations from a baseline 
inflation rate of 3 percent, the welfare gain from adopting 
an inflation rate of-1.3 percent shrinks to $14 billion. The 
welfare gain from adopting a stable price level is even 
smaller—only about $10 billion. 
Taken together, these results indicate that the maxi-
mum welfare gain from reducing inflation below its cur-
rent rate is less than one-half of 1 percent of consumption. 
The asymmetry in the chart also shows that reducing the 
inflation rate enough to achieve a gain of this magnitude 
is very risky. If the inflation rate is reduced too far, house-
holds could be made much worse off than they would be 
with moderate levels of inflation. Given the large amount 
of uncertainty in the measured value of inflation, the larg-
est likely achievable gain seems to be $14 billion. This is 
only 0.36 percent of consumption, which is small relative 
to the gains that other reforms could achieve. Thomas 
Cooley and Gary Hansen (1992), for example, estimate 
the gains from removing the U.S. tax on capital income 
and replacing it with a higher inflation rate to be much 
larger, more than 2.5 percent of gross national product, or 
$150 billion. 
Plausible modifications of the model's specification 
weaken the case for deflation even more. For instance, the 
form of the money demand function derived here implies 
that households' demand for real balances are unbounded 
as the interest rate on bonds, R, approaches zero. This is 
the source of the asymmetry in the chart. As R approaches 
zero, the revenue requirements needed to offset the loss to 
government revenue from deflating get very large. Raising 
the labor tax to meet these additional revenue requirements 
imposes a large welfare cost on households. Suppose in-
stead that the transaction technology is specified as 
(28) logK) = v0 - vMl+R,)] + v2log(c,) + 8,. 
The difference between (28) and (24) is that the interest 
rate term in (28) is not logged. This is often referred to as 
a semilog money demand specification. For this specifica-
tion, a zero nominal interest rate is consistent with finite 
holdings of real balances. 
Thomas Cooley and Gary Hansen (1991) and Lucas 
(1993) consider the welfare gains from reducing inflation 
in frameworks that are consistent with a semilog money 
demand function. Cooley and Hansen find that welfare de-
clines when the inflation rate is reduced from 5 percent to 
zero and the forgone revenue is replaced with a higher tax 
on either labor or capital income. Lucas (1993) compares 
the welfare costs of moderate inflation using transaction 
cost functions that are consistent with each of the two al-
ternate specifications of the money demand function shown 
in (24) and (28). He finds that shifting to a transaction cost 
function that implies a semilog money demand function 
cuts welfare costs by two-thirds. 
Adopting such a function can also overturn the conclu-
sion that deflation is optimal. In Braun 1994,1 consider a 
cash-in-advance economy that imposes restrictions on a 
semilog money demand function. For this economy, when 
lump-sum taxes are ruled out, the welfare-maximizing in-
flation rate is positive. 
Conclusion 
My model suggests that the maximum welfare gains from 
reducing U.S. inflation from its current rate are quite small, 
somewhere in the range of from one-third to one-half of 
16Mark Wynne and Fiona Sigalla (1993) find that these measurement problems are 
equally severe for other measures of the aggregate price level. 
24 R. Anton Braun 
Reducing Inflation 
1 percent of annual GDP. These results appear quite rea-
sonable, but they must be viewed cautiously. My analysis 
has an obvious limitation: it ignores the effects of uncer-
tainty, which can have important welfare implications. 
Ay§e Imrohoroglu (1992), for example, finds that if house-
holds have limited access to financial markets and expe-
rience periodic, idiosyncratic shocks to labor income, then 
the welfare costs of moderate inflation are substantially 
larger than my model suggests. Still, I think the most di-
rect way to deal with those costs is not to try to reduce in-
flation, but rather to introduce regulatory reforms that pro-
vide individuals with readier access to financial markets. 
Some economists think that the most important costs 
of inflation stem not from its average value, but from its 
variability. However, finding a formal model consistent 
with that idea is difficult. Work by V. V. Chari, Lawrence 
Christiano, and Patrick Kehoe (1991), for example, shows 
that a highly variable inflation rate is one component of 
an optimal government policy in a flexible price model. 
True, the costs of a variable inflation rate would be higher 
if prices were not free to adjust due to, say, labor contracts 
that limit employers' ability to adjust wages. On net, how-
ever, I suspect that the welfare gains from adopting a 
monetary policy aimed at stabilizing cyclical fluctuations 
are quite small. My basis for this is calculations by Robert 
Lucas (1987) which suggest that a representative individu-
al would pay only 0.1 percent of consumption, or about 
$15 per year, for insurance that would guarantee the per-
son a smooth consumption path that grew at the rate of 
GDP. This means that even if monetary policy could re-
move all cyclical fluctuations in consumption, the welfare 
gains would be only about 0.1 percent of consumption per 
year. For the U.S. economy in 1991, this would have been 
about $3.9 billion. In fact, however, monetary policy can-
not smooth consumption completely; thus, the gains are 
likely to be even smaller. 
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